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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











UNIT MANAGER STEVE BUZAS (RHU) 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(W.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 2-16-cv-00302) 
Chief Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Cynthia R. Eddy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 4, 2020 
 
Before: KRAUSE, MATEY and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 







 Desmond Keels, a Pennsylvania state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals an order 
of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granting 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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summary judgment in favor of Steve Buzas, a Unit Manager at SCI-Fayette.  We will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 Keels alleges in his Amended Complaint that prison staff have a “fight club” in the 
Restricted Housing Unit, that they arrange fights between inmates, and that they bet on 
who will win.  Keels states that Buzas tried to recruit him to participate a number of 
times.  He avers that on November 22, 2015, Buzas offered him single cell status and a 
prison transfer if he would fight on his behalf.  Keels states that he refused, although he 
also avers that Buzas later offered him cigarettes and asked if they still had a deal.      
Keels alleges that inmate Muir became his cellmate a few days earlier and that 
Muir insisted that he and Keels fight in the fight club.  Keels states that he suggested to 
Muir that they “should call off the battle,” but Muir said that he was going forward with 
the fight.  Keels avers that he defended himself in a fight with Muir and that he was 
charged with misconduct afterwards in order to cover up the fact that Buzas and others 
had arranged it.  He states that Buzas told him that he took the fight too far and that the 
fight was “on record” because Muir had to go to the hospital.  Keels asked Buzas about 
his single cell status and Buzas told him that he was not getting it and that he should keep 
quiet.  Buzas allegedly said that he could not believe that Keels almost killed a man over 
single cell status, a transfer, and cigarettes.   
Keels avers that he received 180 days in disciplinary custody and appears to state 
that prison staff have charged him with additional misconduct because of the incident.  
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He claims that Buzas violated his Eighth Amendment rights by placing him in danger, his 
First Amendment right to be free from retaliation, and his Fourteenth Amendment rights.   
Buzas moved for summary judgment on the ground that Keels failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies under the Department of Corrections’ Inmate Grievance System 
Policy Statement, Policy Number DC-ADM 804 (“DC-ADM 804”).  Buzas provided a 
declaration by the prison’s Grievance Coordinator, who stated that Keels had filed two 
grievances within the prescribed time after the incident and that neither grievance raised 
the claims in his lawsuit.   
In response, Keels asserted that he exhausted his administrative remedies through 
the disciplinary appeals process pursuant to the Department of Corrections’ Procedural 
Manual on Inmate Discipline, Policy Number DC-ADM 801 (“DC-ADM 801”).  Keels 
submitted a record of his misconduct reports showing that he had filed three appeals 
related to the misconduct at issue and that the hearing officer’s guilty verdict on charges 
of assault and unlawful restraint was upheld.     
The District Court ruled that Keels had failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies and granted Buzas’ motion for summary judgment.1  It explained that DC-ADM 
804 provides a three-step process that a prisoner must follow to properly exhaust his 
administrative remedies, and that the record reflected that Keels did not file any 
grievances concerning the alleged fight club, wrongdoing by Buzas, or the constitutional 
 
1The parties consented to adjudication by a Magistrate Judge. 
4 
 
claims raised in his complaint.  The District Court stated that the materials Keels 
submitted did not show that he had filed a grievance concerning the issues in his lawsuit 
or that the administrative process was not available to him.  This appeal followed.   
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a determination of 
a failure to exhaust de novo and the District Court’s factual findings for clear error.  
Small v. Camden Cty., 728 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013).     
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a prisoner to exhaust his available 
administrative remedies before bringing an action with respect to prison conditions under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any other federal law.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Ross v. Blake, 136 S. 
Ct. 1850, 1856 (2016).  Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that the defendant 
must plead and prove.  Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 268 (3d Cir. 2018).   
Keels argues on appeal that the applicable administrative remedy in his case is the 
appeal process under DC-ADM 801.  He contends that a prisoner cannot file a grievance 
about a misconduct charge.  Keels relies on the following provision of DC-ADM 804: 
Issues concerning a specific inmate misconduct charge, conduct of 
hearing, statements written within a misconduct and/or other report, a 
specific disciplinary sanction, and/or the reasons for placement in 
administrative custody will not be addressed through the Inmate Grievance 
System and must be addressed through Department policy DC-ADM 801, 
‘Inmate Discipline’ and/or DC-ADM 802, ‘Administrative Custody 
Procedures.’  Issues other than [sic] specified above must be addressed 




Buzas’ App’x 2 to Motion for Summary Judgment, DC-ADM 804, Section 1.A.7 
(emphasis in DC-ADM 804).2  Buzas contends that “access to the ordinary grievance 
process for claims is only restricted to the relatively narrow circumstances of those issues 
that are directly related to the imposition of prison discipline; . . . .”  Brief at 13. 
 We need not decide whether DC-ADM 804 or DC-ADM 801 applies because 
there is no indication that Keels pressed the claims in his complaint under either policy.  
As Buzas notes in his brief, Keels does not assert on appeal that he actually raised his 
claims in his disciplinary appeals.  He also did not assert that he did so in response to the 
motion for summary judgment.  The fact that Keels appealed the finding of misconduct is 
insufficient to survive summary judgment.   
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
 
2It is not clear that this provision was in effect when the November 22, 2015 incident 
occurred.  Because the parties do not dispute that the provision applies, we assume that it 
does for purposes of this appeal.    
